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Introduction
1  For media articles identifying the main controversial aspects of the ChAFTA, see: Gabrielle Chan, ‘Confused about the China Australia free trade deal: here’s what you need to know’, The 
Guardian, 3 September 2015; Paul Kelly, ‘A poll fought over “Aussie jobs”’, The Australian, 5 September 2015.
Significant controversy surrounds the impact of the China-Australia 
Free Trade Agreement (ChAFTA) in a number of areas.1 This report 
focuses on two of these areas by examining the ChAFTA’s provisions 
on labour mobility.
The first area of controversy is whether the ChAFTA will enable 
Chinese workers to replace local workers in the Australian 
labour market. This question hinges upon whether the Australian 
Government can impose labour market testing to determine whether 
a genuine skills shortage exists in the local labour market. Without 
labour market testing there is no regulatory mechanism to ensure 
that local job opportunities are protected.
The second area of controversy is whether the ChAFTA allows for, or 
will result in, Chinese workers receiving poorer wages and conditions 
than local workers in the Australian labour market.  
This report is structured in two parts. Part One considers the three 
provisions in the ChAFTA that provide the opportunity for Chinese 
workers to access the Australian labour market. The labour mobility 
clauses in Chapter 10 and the two memorandums concerning large-
scale infrastructure development projects and the annual entry of 
working holiday makers each facilitate this opportunity. This report 
identifies each of these entry pathways into the Australian labour 
market and examines how they will operate in practice. 
Part One of the report makes a number of findings. Firstly, the report 
finds the ChAFTA greatly increases the access of Chinese workers to 
the Australian labour market. The report recommends the Australian 
Government use its enabling legislation to clarify that labour market 
testing will apply to certain categories of Chinese workers. In 
particular, there needs to be labour market testing in a manner that is 
consistent with Australia’s 457 visa program, before employers can 
access Chinese workers who are ‘contractual service suppliers’ or 
‘installers and servicers’. Without labour market testing, there is no 
regulatory mechanism to prevent an employer from preferencing a 
Chinese worker over a local worker for these two categories.
Secondly, the report also finds that there needs to be greater 
protection to ensure Chinese workers are not used as a way 
of undercutting local wages and conditions. This can be done 
by making it a requirement that Chinese workers be paid the 
applicable market salary rate and not merely the award rate for their 
occupational category. The market salary rate can be determined 
through taking into account the current major employing collective 
agreement registered by the Fair Work Commission in the sector 
and/or region, ABS average salary rate data and the Department of 
Employment’s Job Outlook data. 
Thirdly, the report finds that the current regulatory framework for 
Investment Facilitation Arrangements (IFAs) requires reform in order 
to ensure it is a legislated framework that mandates labour market 
testing, market salary rates and the achievement of greater public 
accountability and transparency around IFAs.
Part Two of the report examines two key issues concerning the 
ChAFTA’s impact on Australian labour standards. 
The first issue pertains to the role and importance of labour market 
testing in determining the composition of Australia’s migrant worker 
intake. This section finds that both the OECD and two independent 
Australian government reports published in the last two years 
suggest that it is necessary for countries to have a clear and concrete 
process for determining which occupations are eligible for temporary 
migration. It is essential, therefore, that the Australian Government 
relies on labour market testing to assess whether Chinese workers 
are filling genuine vacancies in the Australian labour market. The 
report recommends that Australia adopt a consistent approach to 
labour market testing so that workers entering Australia via a free 
trade agreement are subject to the same labour market testing 
requirements as under Australia’s 457 visa program.
The second issue concerns whether temporary migrant workers 
from China can and/or will be paid less or treated differently to 
local workers performing equivalent jobs in the Australian labour 
market. Although it is true that Chinese workers will be required to 
be employed in accordance with Australia’s employment laws and 
are entitled to Australian wages and conditions, it is equally true that 
where these workers are being exploited or being used to undercut 
local wages and conditions, it is highly unlikely this will be uncovered 
by authorities, due to the inadequacies of existing regulatory 
enforcement arrangements. This section explores the myriad reasons 
why this is so, including the significant wage differentials between 
China and Australia, the employer-driven nature of Australia’s 
temporary migrant worker program and the limited resources of 
our enforcement inspectorate, the Fair Work Ombudsman. It is also 
highly unlikely that Chinese workers themselves will raise the alarm 
about underpayment of wages or exploitative treatment because of 
structural reasons inherent in temporary migrant worker programs, 
relating to the precarious position of migrant workers, especially 
those on temporary and employer-sponsored visa arrangements.
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Thus, this report finds that there 
are real concerns that the ChAFTA 
greatly increases the ability of Chinese 
workers to access the Australian labour 
market, without sufficient regard for 
the necessary regulatory framework to 
protect those workers from exploitation 
or to safeguard Australian job 
opportunities, wages and conditions. 
Although advocates of the ChAFTA will point to the text of the 
agreement that requires Chinese workers be employed according 
to Australian law, and government policy which currently stipulates 
labour market testing for labour agreements, neither of these are 
sufficient to ensure that the ChAFTA’s operation in practice does 
not place downward pressure on Australian wages, conditions and 
labour standards. 
Increasingly, there is an unquestioned economic philosophy that 
systems need to be less regulated by government and driven by 
the needs of employers, with market responsiveness, timeliness 
and flexibility as the drivers and indicators of success. Be that as 
it may, there is a strong case for government regulation to ensure 
that temporary labour migration is used to address genuine skill 
needs in the local labour market, without being used as a vehicle 
to unnecessarily increase labour supply and reduce local wages 
and conditions. Without clarification in the enabling legislation, 
the ChAFTA does not achieve the right balance between these 
two needs. Not only does the ChAFTA attempt to prevent the 
Australian government from regulating its temporary labour migration 
program with respect to Chinese workers to include some form of 
labour market testing, but it greatly increases the entry pathways 
for Chinese workers to enter the Australian labour market. Taken 
together, these two provisions make it extremely hard for the 
Australian Government to determine the scope and composition of 
its temporary migrant workforce, which is an important sovereign 
right and responsibility for any national government. 
Thus, it is vital that the ChAFTA’s implementation be accompanied 
by enabling legislation that stipulates the application of labour 
market testing and market salary rates to Chinese workers, greater 
public accountability and transparency around investment facilitation 
arrangements and a substantial increase in the enforcement capacity 
and powers of the Fair Work Ombudsman.
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PART ONE 
Entry Pathways for Chinese 
Workers under the ChAFTA  
and the Application of Labour 
Market Testing
This Part explains and critically examines the three regulatory mechanisms 
under the ChAFTA which facilitate the entry of temporary Chinese workers. A 
central controversy around the ChAFTA is whether the Australian Government 
can require labour market testing for Chinese workers coming into Australia 
through these entry pathways.
Entry Pathway #1: General Provisions 
Permitting Access
Chapter 10 of the China-Australia Free Trade Agreement regulates 
the movement of people between China and Australia. 
Article 10.4 concerns temporary entry and provides two limitations 
on the ability of the government of either country to facilitate 
temporary movements between China and Australia. 
Firstly, neither country is permitted to impose a cap on the number 
of temporary entrants from the other country. 
Secondly, neither country is able to use labour market testing or any 
other similar regulatory mechanism to determine the composition of 
temporary entrants. 
These are drafted as reciprocal obligations but they have a far 
greater effect on the Australian labour market as there will be many 
more Chinese workers that wish to work in Australia than Australian 
workers that wish to work in China. Although the reasons why an 
individual decides to move temporarily to work in another country 
are complex, differentials in wages and employment conditions 
function as a necessary condition for international migration to 
occur,2 and this is especially so as between China and Australia 
given the huge wage disparity between the two countries.3 The 
absence of a cap and labour market testing in Australia is likely to 
enable large numbers of Chinese workers to come to Australia, 
whereas the low wages and poor working conditions in China mean 
it is highly unlikely that flows in the other direction will occur to the 
same extent.
Specifically, Article 10.4, paragraph 3 states: 
  In respect of the specific commitments on temporary entry in this 
Chapter, unless otherwise specified in Annex 10-A, neither Party 
shall:
 (a)  impose or maintain any limitations on the total number of 
visas to be granted to natural persons of the other Party; or
 (b)  require labour market testing, economic needs testing 
or other procedures of similar effect as a condition for 
temporary entry.’
A number of potential problems arise from Article 10.4, paragraph 
3 in its present form deriving from its impact upon Australia’s 
temporary labour migration program, the subclass 457 visa.
Firstly, it undermines Australia’s ability to make its own immigration 
laws in the national interest. Although the stated objective of 
Australia’s subclass 457 visa program is to meet skill shortages 
in the domestic labour market, Article 10.4, paragraph 3 of the 
ChAFTA prevents Australia from imposing a cap on the number 
of Chinese 457 visa holders. This means even if the Australian 
Government wished to constrain the number of 457 visa holders 
more generally because local unemployment was high or to reflect 
changing economic circumstances, it could not do so with respect 
2 Massey  DS, Arango J, Hugo G, Kouaouci A, Pellegrino A, Taylor E J, Worlds in Motion - Understanding International Migration at the end of the Millenium, Oxford, Clarendon Press,  2008 , p 279.
3 For statistics as to this wage disparity, see Part II of this report. See also: Sean Cooney, Sarah Biddulph and Ying Zhu, Law and Fair Work in China (Routledge 2013). 
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to Chinese citizens. So long as a Chinese applicant for a 457 visa 
met the general eligibility criteria for the visa, the Government 
could not reject the application. The absence of a cap means that 
Australians employers can engage unlimited numbers of Chinese 
citizens on 457 visas. Whilst it is true that Australia’s current program 
settings for the 457 visa do not include an overall cap on the amount 
of 457 visas issued each year, this has not always been so. From 1 
July 2013 until 14 February 2014, employer-sponsors were required 
to justify the number of workers to be sponsored for 457 visas as 
part of the sponsorship approval process, and a certain number of 
possible 457 sponsorships were approved. Once this ‘nomination 
ceiling’ was reached, an employer could not breach it without applying 
to have the cap increased to allow sponsoring of further employees. 
It is concerning that Article 10.4, paragraph 3 sets out to constrain 
present and future governments from using caps as a mechanism to 
determine the composition of Australia’s temporary entrants.
Secondly, and of even greater significance, is the ban on labour 
market testing or any ‘other procedure of similar effect’. This 
removes the ability of the Australian Government to ensure 
Chinese workers are only employed in Australia where there is 
no local worker available to do the job. This limits the Australian 
Government’s achievement of a central purpose of the 457 visa 
program provided for in legislation, namely, ‘to address genuine skill 
shortages in the Australian labour market’4. 
The prohibition on labour market testing contained in the ChAFTA 
prevents present and future Australian Governments from using 
selection criteria that has the effect of determining whether there is 
an actual and legitimate labour market need for a Chinese worker to 
enter Australia or whether the alleged shortage can be filled locally. 
With respect to Chinese workers, this neuters the current safeguard 
in the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) which requires an approved sponsor 
to undertake labour market testing to ensure that a ‘a suitably 
qualified and experienced Australian citizen or Australian permanent 
resident is not readily available to fill the nominated position’.5 In 
this way, the ChAFTA enables an employer to decide to replace an 
Australian worker with a Chinese worker on a 457 visa. 
Thus, Article 10.4, paragraph 3 significantly expands the scope for 
Chinese citizens to access the Australian labour market through the 
457 visa program and in contradiction with the central objective of 
the program as enshrined in legislation. Article 10.4, paragraph 3  
renders Australia’s labour market far more porous to Chinese workers  
than in its current form. Further, this provision purports to prevent the 
Australian Government from enacting legislation to rectify this.
Which categories of Chinese workers will be exempt 
from labour market testing under Chapter 10 of the 
ChAFTA?
On 16 September 2015 the Turnbull Government introduced into the 
Australian Parliament its enabling legislation for the ChAFTA.6 The 
Explanatory Memorandum for this legislation establishes that labour  
market testing will not apply to certain categories of Chinese workers.7 
This means that for these categories there will be no regulatory 
mechanism to ensure Chinese workers are not replacing local workers 
in the Australian labour market. These categories are provided for in 
Annex 10-A of the ChAFTA and it is to this we now turn.
(ii) Annex 10-A
Annex 10-A accords certain categories of Chinese citizens with 
rights to enter and work in Australia for a limited time period, and 
without labour market testing:
 >  intra-corporate transferees and independent executives for up to 
four years 
 >  contractual service suppliers, for up to  
four years;
 >  business visitors for up to 90 days (or six months in the case of 
service providers); and
 >  installers and servicers of machinery and/or equipment for up to 
three months.
Annex 10-A is conspicuous for the breadth of access provided to 
Chinese citizens to enter the Australian labour market in a range of 
occupations and industries, for an extended period of time. Whilst it 
is entirely legitimate (and indeed consistent with Australia’s 457 visa 
program) that some of these categories not be subject to labour 
market testing, for example, independent executives and intra-
corporate transferees, or those in ASCO skill levels 1 and 2, for other 
categories, particularly those involving lower skilled occupations (ie. 
ASCO skill levels 3 and 4), it is vital that some form of labour market 
testing apply.
Intra-corporate transferees 
Annex 10A, paragraphs 5 and 6 provide entry to ‘Intra-corporate 
transferees of China’ for a period of up to four years, with the 
capacity for further stay. A transferee must be:
 >  an executive or a senior manager
 >  a specialist with advanced, trade, technical or professional skills
 >  a manager who primarily directs the enterprise or a department or 
subdivision of the enterprise
Therefore, this entry pathway is restricted to senior personnel within 
an enterprise or a staff member with a highly specialised skillset. 
The rationale for providing an entry pathway for intra-company 
transfers is because these workers possess particular proprietary 
knowledge and experience of a Chinese business required to 
carry out its Australian operations. Because it is proprietary, this 
knowledge and experience cannot generally be sourced from the 
Australian labour market, however intra-corporate transfers are often 
undertaken to facilitate the transfer of proprietary knowledge and 
expertise to local staff. Facilitating efficient intra-corporate transfers 
is seen as an important aspect of enabling Chinese businesses to 
grow their Australian operations and to increase their returns on 
project and infrastructure investment.
It is reasonable that this category be exempt from labour market 
testing. Firstly, this is because the rationale for intra-corporate 
transfers means the particular knowledge and experience of the 
Chinese worker cannot be sourced from the local labour market. 
Secondly, the restrictions in the ChAFTA limit the operation of 
this category to senior personnel or a staff member with a highly 
specialised skillset.
4 Migration Act 1958 (Cth), section 140AA.
5 Migration Act 1958 (Cth), section 140GBA.
6 Customs Amendment (China-Australia Free Trade Agreement Implementation) Bill 2015 (Cth).
7 Explanatory Memorandum, Customs Amendment (China-Australia Free Trade Agreement Implementation) Bill 2015, Paragraph 160.
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Independent executives
Annex 10-A, paragraphs 7 and 8 provide entry for independent 
executives of China for a period of up to four years.
An independent executive is defined as an executive of a Chinese 
business who is responsible for establishing a branch or subsidiary 
of that business in Australia.
Similar to the arguments raised in the section on intra-corporate transfers, 
it is reasonable that independent executives of China be exempt from 
labour market testing as this category involves a senior executive 
with specific proprietary knowledge and experience of the business.
Contractual service suppliers of China
Annex 10-A, paragraphs 9, 10 and 11 grant entry to contractual 
service suppliers of China for a period of up to four years, with the 
possibility of further stay.
A contractual service supplier is a Chinese citizen who has trade, 
technical or professional skills and experience. 
This category is not limited to highly skilled workers. It includes 
many occupations for which labour market testing currently applies 
under Australian law. It is vital that labour market testing apply to this 
category otherwise it will be entirely possible for Chinese workers 
to replace Australian workers in fields as diverse as engineering, 
nursing and most trades.
Under these provisions, a business that has a contract with an 
Australian business to supply a service (for example, a hospital 
seeking to staff a particular ward) can bring its own workforce of 
Chinese staff under the contractual service supplier category and 
there will be no requirement that these jobs first be offered to local 
workers. This is why it is vital that the enabling legislation for the 
ChAFTA makes it clear that labour market testing will apply to the 
contractual service supplier category in a manner that is consistent 
with the 457 visa program. 
Installers and servicers of China
Unlike the three aforementioned categories of Chinese workers who 
will be permitted entry through the 457 visa program, installers and 
servicers of China will enter Australia via a Temporary Work (Short 
Stay) Activity Visa, which is a subclass 400 visa. This visa is intended 
for temporary workers who are doing short term, highly specialised, 
non-ongoing work.8 
Annex 10-A, paragraph 13 provides the following description of  
this category:
‘A natural person of China is an installer or servicer of machinery 
and/or equipment where such installation and/or servicing by the 
supplying company is a condition of purchase of the said machinery 
or equipment. An installer or servicer must abide by Australian 
workplace standards and conditions and cannot perform services 
which are not related to the installation or servicing activity which is 
the subject of the contract.’
There is no mandatory skills assessment for an installer or servicer 
from China and it not limited to highly skilled Chinese workers. In 
fact, it is highly likely that under this provision, a low skilled or semi-
skilled Chinese worker could enter Australia under the installer and 
servicer category. 
Although the ChAFTA states that an installer or servicer must abide 
by Australian workplace standards and conditions and cannot 
perform services which are unrelated to the contract, it does provide 
scope for a Chinese worker who is an installer or servicer to be used 
as a way of undercutting the wages and conditions of local workers. 
For example, if a particular sector is governed by a collective 
enterprise bargaining agreement which provides for a higher hourly 
rate than the award, it is perfectly legal for a Chinese business to 
employ a Chinese installer or servicer on the award rate rather 
than the wage which local workers would expect to receive under 
the enterprise agreement. This category of installers and servicers 
enables Chinese workers to effectively outprice local workers for 
certain jobs.
Given that the category of installers and servicers provides easy 
access to the Australian labour market for Chinese workers on lower 
wages and conditions than what local workers would expect, two 
important matters need to be established in the enabling legislation. 
Firstly, it is vital that labour market testing apply for this category. 
Secondly, this category must be subject to a requirement that 
market salary rates be paid in a manner that is consistent with the 
framework for the 457 visa.
Despite having signed the ChAFTA, can Australia 
impose labour market testing on Chinese workers 
who are contractual service suppliers or installers and 
servicers?
Whilst the ChAFTA appears to greatly constrain the ability of the 
Australian Government to apply labour market testing with respect 
to Chinese workers, there is scope within Annex 10-A for the 
Government to mandate a requirement of labour market testing for 
all Chinese workers entering Australia under the contractual service 
supplier and installers and servicers categories. 
The apparent ban on labour market testing in Article 10.4, paragraph 
3 is expressly subject to the parameters specified in Annex 10-A. 
Paragraph 1, of Annex 10-A, states,
  Australia requires a natural person of China seeking temporary 
entry to its territory under the provisions of Chapter 10 
(Movement of Natural Persons) and this Annex to obtain 
appropriate immigration formalities prior to entry. Grant of 
temporary entry in accordance with this Annex is contingent 
on meeting eligibility requirements contained within Australia’s 
migration laws and regulations, as applicable at the time for an 
application for grant of temporary entry. Eligibility requirements 
for grant of temporary entry in accordance with paragraphs 5 
through 11 of this Annex include, but are not limited to employer 
nomination and occupation requirements.9 
As Article 10.4 is subject to Annex 10-A, there is sufficient flexibility 
and scope within the latter to include labour market testing as 
indicated in the italicised phrase. If labour market testing is an 
eligibility requirement contained in Australia’s migration laws and 
regulations, then this will necessarily apply to Chinese workers 
entering the Australian labour market through the entry channels of 
‘contractual service suppliers’ and ‘installers and servicers’ provided 
in Annex 10-A.
Without local labour market testing Chinese workers can replace 
local workers without justification or consequence. Without a market 
salary rates requirement for both contractual service suppliers and 
installers and servicers, Chinese workers can undercut Australian 
wages and conditions by being paid the award wage rather than the 
industry norm which local workers would expect to receive under the 
relevant enterprise agreement.
8 For more on this visa, see: <https://www.border.gov.au/Trav/Visa-1/400->.
9 ChAFTA, Annex 10-A, Section A paragraph 1.
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Therefore, it is critical that the Turnbull Coalition Government, via 
its enabling legislation for the ChAFTA, protect Australia’s right 
to determine the composition of its migrant worker intake. The 
Government needs to clearly establish that Australia’s interpretation 
of Annex 10-A is that labour market testing will apply to Chinese 
workers in a manner that is consistent with the general eligibility 
requirements of the 457 visa program. 
Anything less, would mean that the Australian Government is 
effectively surrendering its autonomy over its migration laws and 
policies with respect to the composition of Australia’s migrant worker 
intake with regards to Chinese workers. The importance of labour 
market testing is considered in Part II of this report, which develops 
the evidential basis for recommendation 4 below.
Recommendation 1:
This report recommends the Government clearly establish in its 
enabling legislation that labour market testing will apply to all 
Chinese workers coming into Australia as contractual service 
suppliers or as installers and servicers via Annex 10-A in the 
China-Australia Free Trade Agreement.
Recommendation 2:
This report recommends that the requirement of labour market 
testing in free trade agreements be consistent with the 457 visa 
program. This requirement of labour market testing for certain 
categories of temporary migrant workers should be enshrined in 
the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).
Recommendation 3:
This report recommends that contractual service suppliers 
and installers and services be subject to a market salary rates 
requirement as stipulated under the 457 visa program.
Recommendation 4:
This report recommends the Australian Government strengthen 
the application of labour market testing for the 457 visa, and 
consistent with the UK approach, adopt a model that is primarily 
predicated on independent labour market testing but which can 
be supplemented, where necessary, with employer-conducted 
labour market testing.
Entry Pathway #2: Investment  
Facilitation Arrangements
Although not formally part of the ChAFTA, a Memorandum of 
Understanding between the two countries was agreed upon 
regarding the establishment of an Investment Facilitation 
Arrangement (IFA). The purpose of this memorandum is to 
encourage Chinese investment in Australia by permitting 
Chinese companies registered in Australia and undertaking large 
infrastructure development projects costing above A$150 million to 
negotiate for increased labour flexibility on a specific, case-by-case 
basis with the Department of Immigration. 
IFAs are intended to ensure guaranteed labour supply for the 
duration of infrastructure development projects and to manage the 
commercial risk arising from a labour or skill shortage occurring 
during the project lifetime. This rationale of guaranteeing labour 
supply is important as concerns over labour or skills shortages can 
deter foreign investment.10 Shortages can be fatal to large-scale 
projects, by increasing the construction phase of projects, resulting 
in increased costs and faltering confidence by investors.11
Although the Turnbull Coalition Government has stated that the 
framework for IFAs is comparable to the framework for enterprise 
migration agreements introduced by the Rudd and Gillard Labor 
Governments, there is one important area of distinction. The 
enterprise migration agreements model set the threshold at $2bn. 
The EMA model was justified in large part because of the economic 
significance of the projects involved. In contrast, the $150m 
threshold established by the ChAFTA is a significant discrepancy and 
likely to cover many more projects thus raising the possibility that 
this could be a major avenue for recruitment of migrant labour. 
The process for making an IFA
There are three steps before Chinese workers can be employed 
under an IFA.
Step One:
IFAs can only be negotiated for certain industries. The memorandum 
allows Chinese workers to be brought into Australia to work 
on the project, so long as the project is related to infrastructure 
development within the food and agribusiness, resources and 
energy, transport, telecommunications, power supply and 
generation, environment or tourism sectors.
To access an IFA, a project company must first apply to the China 
International Contractors Association (CHINCA). CHINCA will 
then write to the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. The 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade is then responsible for 
assessing whether the project company’s application meets the 
memorandum’s eligibility criteria. Within 20 days, the Department 
of Foreign Affairs and Trade is required to notify the Department of 
Immigration that the proposed project constitutes an eligible project 
under the terms of the memorandum. 
Step Two:
This stage involves the Department of Immigration taking over the 
negotiation process for an IFA. Labour market testing is not required 
to enter into an IFA with a project company. In paragraph 6 of the 
memorandum, it clearly stipulates, ‘there will be no requirement for 
labour market testing to enter into an IFA.’
At this stage, the Department of Immigration and the project 
company are permitted to negotiate ‘concessions’. In this way, 
the IFA opens up new immigration possibilities as compared to 
Australia’s official pathway for labour immigration, the 457 visa.
The 457 visa is aimed as a highly skilled work visa and is subject to 
a number of restrictions upon employer-sponsors, in particular:
 >  occupations must be listed on the Consolidated Sponsored 
Occupations List (CSOL)12
 >  visa holders must meet certain English language requirements13 
 
10 ‘Why the era of giant commodity projects in Australia is over’, South China Morning Post, 15 August 2015, <http://www.scmp.com/business/commodities/article/1849643/why-era-giant-commodity-
projects-australia-over>
11 For example, see: Business Council of Australia (2012), Pipeline or Pipe Dream? Securing Australia’s Investment Future, Melbourne. See also, S Bahn, ‘Workers on 457 Visas: Evidence from the West 
Australian Resources Sector’ (2013) 39 Australian Bulletin of Labor 34, 35.
12 <https://www.border.gov.au/Trav/Work/Work/Skills-assessment-and-assessing-authorities/skilled-occupations-lists/CSOL>.
13 Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), Specification of Tests, Scores, Period, Level of Salary and Exemptions to the English Language Requirement for Subclass 457 (Temporary Work (Skilled)) Visas 2015 
- IMMI 15/028.
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 >  visa holders’ salaries must be above the Temporary Skilled 
Migration Income Threshold (TSMIT). The TSMIT is currently set at 
$53,900.14 
Whilst it is true that Chinese workers will need to be employed in 
compliance with Australian labour laws, the memorandum allows 
“concessions” to be made with regards to the required standards for 
the CSOL, English language ability and the TSMIT.
This means that the project company can negotiate via a private 
contract with the Department of Immigration to import Chinese 
workers to work on the project in lower skilled occupations, with 
lower level English-language ability and for a salary lower than the 
TSMIT.
Key Issue: Can Chinese workers employed via an IFA 
undercut Australian wages and conditions?
The simple answer to this question is in the affirmative: there 
is no requirement in the memorandum that a Chinese worker 
employed via an IFA receives the same wages and conditions 
for their occupation as a local worker. The only stipulation in the 
memorandum is that the award rate be paid. Similarly, in the Project 
Agreements information booklet which is the policy document 
governing IFAs there is no market salary rates requirement. This 
means the ChAFTA could be used to create an IFA which undercuts 
local wages and conditions because although local workers may 
expect to be paid a higher rate for a certain occupation as provided 
for in the relevant enterprise agreement, a Chinese worker may be 
willing to work for the far lesser rate provided for in the award. 
This effectively means that so long as the award rate is an acceptable 
concession on the TSMIT which has been negotiated in advance 
with the Department, then a Chinese worker employed via an IFA is 
simultaneously being employed in accordance with Australian law 
and at the same time undercutting local wages and conditions that 
are provided for in enterprise agreements. The risk of this occurring 
is high given that it provides Chinese employers with a relatively easy 
way to cut labour costs on infrastructure development projects. 
It is also of concern that it is an Australian federal government 
department who is responsible for negotiating outcomes on labour 
with a Chinese company, who in many cases will be a Chinese 
State Owned Enterprise. This has the potential to make the wages 
and conditions that a Chinese worker will receive under an IFA a 
source of diplomatic dispute. It is entirely conceivable that situations 
may arise where it is an Australian government agency opposing a 
Chinese government agency’s intentions in remunerating its staff. 
This is why it would be preferable for all the parties involved to 
operate under a clear legislative framework governing IFAs with 
two key components. Firstly, this framework should provide a 
legislative requirement for labour market testing before Chinese 
workers can be employed under an IFA. Secondly, this framework 
should encompass a legislative requirement that Chinese workers 
receive the same wages and conditions as local workers for 
each occupational category specified in the IFA. The process for 
determining the applicable local wage and employment conditions 
for each occupation should take into account, but is not limited to 
the following:
 >  The current major employing collective agreement registered by 
the Fair Work Commission in the sector and/or region;
 > ABS average salary rate data; and
 > The Department of Employment’s Job Outlook data. 
Cumulatively, these data sets will enable the Department of 
Immigration to identify what a local worker would expect to receive 
in terms of wages and conditions, to ensure Chinese workers on 
IFAs are not used a way of cutting labour costs.
In order to ensure continuing public support for investment 
facilitation arrangements, it is essential that these do not result 
in temporary migrant workers being employed on lower wages 
and conditions than comparable local workers. In an article in the 
Cambridge Journal of Economics, Michael Quinlan and Constance 
Lever-Tracy established that the existence of labour market 
regulations that ensured employers had to offer equal or better 
wages to migrant workers was critical to the acceptance of large 
scale migration from 1945 onwards:
  The establishment of a pervasive network of legally enforceable 
sets of wages and conditions through the arbitration system 
after 1900, together with the growing organisational strength  
of unions, restricted the capacity of employers to use 
immigrants as a “super exploitable” category of labour. 
This formed the cornerstone of union acceptance of mass 
immigration after 1945 and of their growing tolerance towards 
non-European workers. It follows that a shift towards a more 
deregulated labour market which undermines union influence 
and the arbitration system, could foment divisions within the 
labour market and arouse strident union and working class 
hostility to further immigration.15
Similarly, respected Australian demographer, the late Professor 
Graeme Hugo, has previously criticised this type of approach, 
arguing, ‘[b]est practice should be to offer wages at the same (or 
better) levels than are offered to local workers. In this way, labour 
shortages reported by employers are more likely to be genuine’.16  
In this regard, the ChAFTA falls well short of a best practice 
approach to designing a temporary labour migration program 
to meet local skill shortages and safeguard local workers from 
displacement by temporary migrant labour, which necessarily will 
affect community acceptance of IFAs.
Recommendation 5:
This report recommends that Chinese workers receive the same 
wages and conditions as equivalent local workers for each 
occupational category specified in the investment facilitation 
arrangement. The process for determining the applicable local 
wage and employment conditions for each occupation should 
take into account, but is not limited to the following:
 > The current major employing collective agreement registered by 
the Fair Work Commission in the sector and/or region;
 > ABS average salary rate data; and
 > The Department of Employment’s Job Outlook data. 
14 Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), Specification of Income Threshold and Annual Earnings – IMMI 13/028.
15  M Quinlan & C Lever-Tracy, ‘From Labour Market Exclusion to Industrial Solidarity: Australian Trade Union Responses to Asian Workers, 1830-1988’ (1990) 14 (2) Cambridge Journal of Economics  
159, 160-161.
16 Graeme Hugo, ‘Best Practice in Temporary Labour Migration for Development: A Perspective from Asia and the Pacific’ (2009) 47(5) International Migration 23, 59.
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Step three:
Once an IFA has been established between the Department and the 
project company, individual employers involved in the project can 
enter into a labour agreement with the Department of Immigration 
for Chinese workers to be engaged on the project. At this stage, 
the memorandum permits the imposition of a labour market testing 
requirement which employers can satisfy by demonstrating ‘they 
have first tested the Australian labour market and not found sufficient 
suitable workers’.17 It is important to note that this imposition of 
labour market testing is discretionary rather than mandatory under 
the ChAFTA. The memorandum states that a labour agreement 
will set out the number and type of jobs needed for the project and 
‘the sponsorship obligations associated with the labour agreement, 
including any requirements for labour market testing’. A footnote to 
the memorandum says that ‘where labour market testing is required, 
employers may satisfy this requirement by demonstrating that they 
have first tested the Australian labour market and not found sufficient 
suitable workers.’
Key issue: Does the memorandum allow the use of an 
IFA to facilitate Chinese workers replacing local workers 
in the Australian labour market?
Since signing the ChAFTA, the Australian Government has pointed 
to three policy documents, which attest to the inability of the 
IFA provisions being used to replace local workers with Chinese 
workers. In its view, these policy documents mean that the ChAFTA 
does not allow Chinese companies to bring in workers for major 
projects without first offering these jobs to Australian workers. Trade 
Minister Andrew Robb states unequivocally that to say otherwise is 
‘dead wrong’.18 
The first of these documents is the ‘China-Australia Free Trade 
Agreement Investment Facilitation Arrangement/Project Agreement 
Operation Flowchart’.19 This document states that to enter into an IFA, 
‘robust labour market analysis’ must be provided to the Department 
of Immigration. The flowchart also states that to enter into a 
labour agreement under an IFA, an employer must show ‘there is 
demonstrated labour market need, Australians have been given the 
first opportunity through evidence of domestic recruitment activity (ie 
labour market testing) and there are no suitably qualified Australians.’
The second of these documents is the ‘China-Australia FTA: Myths 
versus Realities’ released on the website of the Department of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade on 17 July 2015.20 This document states 
‘Under IFAs, Australian workers will continue to be given first 
opportunity. Consistent with existing practice, employers will not be 
permitted to bring in overseas skilled workers unless there is clear 
evidence of a genuine labour market need, as determined by the 
Department of Immigration and Border Protection.’
The third of these documents is the information booklet: ‘Project 
Agreements – Information for Employers – Requesting a Labour 
Agreement’.21 Of all three, this document provides the most 
comprehensive enunciation of what labour market testing will look 
like for Chinese companies seeking to use a labour agreement under 
an IFA. This document provides the following advice to employers:
  You must provide a comprehensive written statement of 
the labour market need for the requested occupation(s), 
demonstrating ongoing shortages. This includes a project 
workforce profile illustrating the composition of the business’ 
current and future anticipated workforce on the project, as well 
as evidence that you have made significant efforts to recruit 
workers from the Australian labour market within the previous 
17 MoU on Investment Facilitation Arrangements, paragraph 8, footnote 6.
18  Minister Andrew Robb made this statement in response to an ABC Fact Check regarding the ChAFTA. A copy of his statement can be found here: <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-08-13/andrew-
robb-responds-to-fact-check/6694628>.
19  A copy of this document can be found here: <https://www.border.gov.au/WorkinginAustralia/Documents/ifa-operation-flowchart.pdf>. This flowchart was made publicly available in the following media 
release: Assistant Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, Labor Caught Out Peddling Myths on IFAs, media release, 24 July 2015.
20 A copy of this document can be found here: <http://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/chafta/fact-sheets/Pages/chafta-myths-versus-realities.aspx>
21  A copy of this document can be found here: http://www.border.gov.au/WorkinginAustralia/Documents/project-agreement-employer.pdf#search=labour%20agreements. This information booklet was 
published by the Department of Immigration in May 2015 but became the subject of a media release concerning its use with regards to the ChAFTA’s IFA provisions: Assistant Minister for Immigration and 
Border Protection, Ms Michaelia Cash and Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Trade and Investment, Mr Steven Ciobo, Facts Expose Dishonesty of Union’s Scare, joint media release, 22 July 2015.
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six months… Evidence of your domestic recruitment efforts 
should include details, for each requested occupation, of 
advertising undertaken within the past six months, including 
the period the job was advertised; the number of applicants 
who were hired; and reasons why other applicants were 
unsuccessful; or provide other compelling evidence of why  
no suitable Australian workers are available. The department  
will only enter into a project labour agreement where it has  
been satisfied that Australians have been provided first 
opportunity for jobs.22 
Cumulatively, these three documents assert that it is current 
government policy for labour market testing to be applied to Chinese 
companies seeking to employ Chinese workers under an IFA. 
Nonetheless, it is possible for both the Australian Government 
to argue that IFAs will not be used to replace local workers by 
pointing to these three documents outlining the application of labour 
market testing and for unions to argue that the ChAFTA will allow 
for the replacement of local workers because the actual text of the 
memorandum does not require labour market testing to be applied 
before Chinese workers can be brought in under an IFA. 
Put simply, the ChAFTA does not require labour market testing to 
be applied to IFAs. The source of this requirement is in government 
policy which is subject to change according to the whim of the 
government and whose amendment is not contingent upon a 
piece of legislation passing through both houses of parliament. 
Government policy, as encapsulated in the flowchart, the myths 
versus realities fact sheet, and the project agreement information 
booklet, can be rewritten at any time by the government of the day.
Thus, there is scope for the IFA provisions in the memorandum to be 
used to replace local workers given there is no mandatory requirement 
of labour market testing. There is also a substantial incentive for this to 
occur as local wages and conditions can be undercut through the  
granting of concessional arrangements for Chinese workers employed 
under an IFA and because there is no requirement that workers on IFAs  
receive the same wages and conditions as equivalent local workers. 
Both these weaknesses of the IFA framework need to be rectified.
Recommendation 6:
This report recommends that the requirement for labour market 
testing for labour agreements signed under an investment 
facilitation arrangement become a legislated requirement through 
an amendment to the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).
Key Issue: Will IFAs be publicly accountable?
IFAs will have the status of private contracts between the Department 
of Immigration and a project company. Similarly, labour agreements 
which are negotiated under an IFA will also have the status of a private 
contract between an individual employer and the Department of  
Immigration. Both IFAs and labour agreements will have ‘commercial-
in-confidence’ clauses which means they will not be on the public 
record. The rationale for establishing confidentiality around these 
agreements is to protect commercially sensitive material.
Nonetheless, there is a growing chorus recognizing that this rationale 
fails to achieve necessary standards of public accountability and 
transparency around IFAs and labour agreements. For example, the  
Business Council of Australia has recently advocated that IFAs and  
their terms pertaining to wages and conditions be listed on a public  
register.23 In making this recommendation, the BCA is recognizing 
the importance of continuing public support for IFAs and the strong  
case for developing far greater public accountability and transparency  
around IFAs than what is currently envisaged in the memorandum. 
Furthermore, it is unclear why the information pertaining to wages 
and conditions in IFAs is so commercially sensitive as to prevent its 
public release, when enterprise bargaining agreements are subject 
to full disclosure of the agreement on the website of the Fair Work 
Commission. If Australian employers have to comply with this 
principle of full disclosure, surely it is reasonable to require the same 
of Chinese employers seeking to operate within Australia. 
Recommendation 7:
This report recommends that once an investment facilitation 
arrangement is in place it must be made publicly available by 
the Department of Immigration on its website. This should be 
accompanied by a public statement stipulating:
 >  the concessions which are granted under the IFA with regards 
to wage levels, skills and English language ability
 >  justification of why each concession has been granted and the 
circumstances surrounding the grant
 > how compliance with each concession will be monitored
 >  the occupations which are covered by the IFA
 >  the salary rates to be paid out to workers for each occupational 
category under the IFA 
 >  the proportion of overseas workers to be employed under the 
arrangement compared with local workers
Recommendation 8:
This report recommends that any labour agreements negotiated 
under the investment facilitation arrangement should be made 
publicly available by the Department of Immigration on its website.  
This should be accompanied by a public statement stipulating:
 >  the concessions which are granted under the labour agreement 
with regards to wage levels, skills and English language ability
 >  justification of why each concession has been granted and the 
circumstances surrounding the grant
 >  how compliance with each concession will be monitored
 >  the occupations which are covered by the labour agreement
 >  the salary rates to be paid out to workers for each occupational 
category under the labour agreement
 >  the proportion of overseas workers to be employed under the 
arrangement compared with local workers
Entry Pathway #3: Work and Holiday Visas
Under the Memorandum of Understanding between Australia and 
China on a Work and Holiday Visa Arrangement, Australia has 
agreed to permit the annual entry of 5000 Chinese citizens on ‘Work 
and Holiday’ visas for a period of twelve months. These visa holders 
must be aged between 18-31, possess sufficient funds to support 
their year abroad and hold tertiary qualifications or have successfully 
completed two years of undergraduate study.
Work and Holiday visa holders will have unrestricted access to the 
Australian labour market. In the memorandum there is a provision 
that states visa holders are required to have regard ‘to the principal 
purpose of their stay…which is a holiday, with work being incidental 
to the holiday’ but this requirement is not currently enforced by 
22 Ibid p 8.
23  Business Council of Australia, Submission to the Joint Standing Committee on the ChAFTA, August 2015, p 4.
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the Department of Immigration. Even if the Department wished to 
enforce this requirement, it would be difficult to do so given that 
Work and Holiday visa holders have no constraints on their access 
to the labour market, other than that one employer cannot employ 
them for more than six months. This requirement is eliminated if 
a visa holder is working in a regional area. Given the high wage 
disparities between Australia and China, it is likely that many 
Chinese citizens will use this visa as a way into the Australian labour 
market and for a primary purpose of work, rather than a holiday 
or for cultural exchange purposes.24 This will result in increased 
competition for low skilled and unskilled work in Australia and will 
lead to reduced entry-level jobs for young Australians. To date, most 
working holiday makers have resided in metropolitan areas where 
they compete with young Australians for jobs in a tight job market.25 
A key concern here is the vulnerability of Chinese Work and Holiday 
visa holders in the Australian labour market. A recent comprehensive 
analysis of the working holiday maker program identified the many 
characteristics of visa holders under this program which create 
this vulnerability and lead them to perform work that is inherently 
precarious. Associate Professor Alexander Reilly states: 
  Working Holiday Makers are young workers, mostly working in 
jobs in which they have no previous employment experience 
and in which they do not have adequate training. Many 
Working Holiday Makers will be employed in jobs requiring 
hard manual labour that they have not previously encountered. 
An increasing proportion comes from non-English-speaking 
backgrounds, which makes it difficult for them to understand 
safety requirements or to ascertain employment protections. 
They do not have secure residence status, and as non-citizens, 
they have limited social and political power.26 
The vulnerability of working holiday makers in the Australian labour 
market has also been recognised by the courts as creating ‘a particular 
class of employee who are potentially vulnerable to improper 
practices by their employer’.27 Unlike under the 457 visa where it is 
a requirement that temporary migrant workers meet certain English 
language ability thresholds, under the Work and Holiday visa for 
Chinese workers, only a basic level of English is required. The poor 
language ability of many working holiday makers has increased their 
vulnerability in the Australian labour market. Research shows there is 
a necessary role for language assistance as the basis for successful 
migrant settlement and/or labour market integration.28 
Working holiday makers have often experienced severe exploitation 
in the Australian labour market. How else to describe a job to dive 
through murky ponds and lakes for golf balls and receiving less than 
$5 per hour,29 or the kinds of exploitative treatment of workers at Baida  
Poultry processing plants,30 or those in fruit-picking jobs exposed by the  
ABC Four Corners program?31 This anecdotal sample is supported 
by both academic and government examinations of the proliferation 
of exploitative work carried out by many working holiday makers.32 
The potential for exploitation of Chinese workers on a Work and 
Holiday visa is compounded by their use of a visa for a non-work 
purpose.33 The presence of such a large and vulnerable migrant 
workforce, that is unregulated outside domestic labour law risks 
creating an underclass of workers who are invisible to the law. There is 
no way of knowing just how many, or where, Chinese Work and 
Holiday visa holders engage in employment. The fact of their employment 
may only become visible when circumstances of exploitation occasionally 
come to light. In its 1997 report, the Joint Standing Committee on 
Migration noted evidence that ‘employers often pay less than award 
wages to Working Holiday Makers, putting pressure on locals to 
accept the same conditions to secure the relevant job’.34 
As a matter of general principle, it is eminently reasonable that China 
should be part of Australia’s Work and Holiday program. The permitted 
annual intake of 5000 places only represents a 2% increase on the 
staggering numbers already coming into Australia through the Work 
and Holiday visa or the Working Holiday visa. The primary issue here,  
is that this further expansion of the working holiday program is 
occurring at a time when a number of concerns have been raised 
about exploitation of working holiday makers in the Australian labour 
market. Viewed from this perspective, it is highly concerning that 
the memorandum facilitates the annual entry of a significant number 
of Chinese young people on the Work and Holiday visa without 
regard for the consequences for their wellbeing or for the Australian 
labour market. If, as it is likely to be, this visa is largely used for a 
work purpose, these young people will be extremely vulnerable 
to exploitation in the workplace and can also be used to increase 
competition for low skilled, entry level jobs which are essential for 
providing young Australians with a foothold in the labour market. 
Recommendation 9:
This report recommends the Government review the Work and 
Holiday Visa and the Working Holiday Visa to ensure this visa 
scheme meets its central purpose of being for cultural exchange 
rather than as a general labour supply visa. In particular, this 
review should address the following:
 >  The need to protect local job opportunities; and
 >  The need to protect working holiday visa holders in the 
Australian labour market from exploitative arrangements.
24  Arguably, this is the way the working holiday visa is already operating. For example, a government report in 2006 found that working holiday makers had become ‘the single largest source of labour for 
seasonal producers’ in some parts of the horticultural industry’: Senate Standing Committee on Employment, Workplace Relations and Education, Perspectives on the Future of the Harvest Workforce (2006).
25  Bob Birrell and Ernest Healy, ‘Immigration Overshoot’ (Research Report, Centre for Population and Urban Research, November 2012).
26  See generally, Alexander Reilly, ‘Low-Cost Labour or Cultural Exchange: Reforming the Working Holiday visa program, Economic and Labour Relations Review (2015), <http://elr.sagepub.com/cgi/
reprint/1035304615598160v1.pdf?ijkey=aKZczfzwHxIOTsC&keytype>.
27  Fair Work Ombudsman v Go Yo Trading Pty Limited & Anor [2012] FMCA 865, [15]. 
28  James Japp, From White Australia to Woomera (Cambridge University Press, 2002).
29  Elise Worthington, ‘Dutch golf-ball diving backpacker sues Queensland company for unpaid wages’, ABC Radio, 20 July 2015; Marissa Calligeros, ‘Dutch backpacker paid $5 an hour to retrieve golf balls 
from lakes’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 22 July 2015.
30  Natalie James, ‘The Fair Work Ombudsman’s Inquiry into the labour procurement arrangements of Baida Group in New South Wales’, 18 June 2015 < http://www.fairwork.gov.au/about-us/news-and-
media-releases/2015-media-releases/june-2015/20150618-baiada-group-statement-of-findings>.
31  Four Corners, ABC, ‘Slaving away: The Dirty Secrets Behind Australia’s Fast Food’, 4 May 2015.
32  Joint Standing Committee on Migration (JSCM) (1997) Working Holiday Makers: more than tourists, August. Canberra: Australian Parliament House, 45; Tan Y, Richardson S, Lester L, et al. (2009) National 
evaluation of Australia’s Working Holiday Maker program. National Institute of Labour Studies, Flinders University, Adelaide, SA, Australia, 27 February; Tan Y and Lester L (2012) Labour market and 
economic impacts of international working holiday temporary migrants to Australia. Population, Space and Place 18(3): 359–383.  
33  Joanna Howe and Alexander Reilly, ‘Meeting Australia’s Labour Needs: The Case for a Low Skill Work Visa’ (2015) 43 (2) Federal Law Review 59.
34  JSCM, 1997: 45.
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PART TWO
Key Issues under the ChAFTA 
Two central points of contention regarding the ChAFTA’s impact on workers 
concern the role and importance of labour market testing and whether Chinese 
workers can and/or will be paid less than their Australian counterparts. Using an 
evidence-based method, this part critically examines both issues.
Issue #1: The role of Labour Market  
Testing in Australia’s Temporary Labour 
Migration Program
What is labour market testing?
Labour market testing means a business has to prove there are no 
local workers who can do a job before temporary visas are granted 
for migrant workers. The policy intent is to protect and privilege the 
employment opportunities of local workers. 
There are a number of ways labour market testing can be 
conducted.35 Australia’s 457 visa program relies upon a model of 
employer-conducted labour market testing. This requires a local 
employer to advertise job vacancies in the local labour market and 
to provide evidence of failed recruitment efforts to the Department 
of Immigration when applying to sponsor a migrant worker for a 457 
visa. Of course the onerousness of the requirement turns upon the 
stringency in which the Department enforces it. The Department’s 
current policy regarding employer-conducted labour market testing 
is fairly weak, indicating that the posting of a single advertisement 
of a job vacancy on a business’s website, any other website or on a 
social media platform such as Facebook will suffice.36 Additionally, 
there is no minimum duration time for the advertisement or a 
requirement that advertising be paid. 
Another model is independent labour market testing. This is where 
a body separate from employers establishes areas of skill shortage 
and/or labour shortage and compiles an occupational shortage list 
to determine which occupations are eligible for temporary labour 
migration. The occupational shortage list can operate at both 
national and/or regional/sector levels. An example of the latter 
approach is the United Kingdom’s Migration Advisory Committee. 
Established in 2007 the Migration Advisory Committee advises the 
Government as to the composition of the occupational shortage 
list, relying on a combination of both hard economic data and input 
from stakeholders.37 For occupations not listed on the shortage 
list, the United Kingdom permits employers to access temporary 
migrant workers if the job offered to the overseas worker passes 
the ‘resident labour market test’. This requires employers to 
advertise the job vacancy in specified forms of media for at least 
28 calendar days,38 with the advertisement specifying the job 
title, job description, location, salary, requisite qualifications, skills, 
experience, and closing date for applications.39 
No method of labour market testing is fool proof. Each carries with it 
risks and challenges. There is a risk that employer-conducted labour 
market testing may simply be a tick-box exercise without sufficient 
pre-admission scrutiny. Furthermore, even within a more evidence-
based approach mediated through an independent advisory body, 
there remains considerable room for employers to assert their ‘need’ 
for particular types of ‘skilled’ migrant labour. The latter brings a real 
challenge of accurately mapping and responding to employers’ skills 
needs in a timely fashion.
Why is labour market testing important?
On the one hand, it could be argued that Australia’s present 
approach to labour market testing in the 457 visa program is 
‘tokenistic’ and ‘ineffective’,40 exempting too many occupations 
and too easy to evade if an employer so desired. Be that as it may, 
defective implementation of the labour market testing requirement 
is not enough to substantiate a case for repeal of this requirement 
35  For a list compiled by the OECD of how other countries approach the issue of labour market testing, see < http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/social-issues-migration-health/
recruiting-immigrant-workers-sweden-2011/characteristics-of-labour-market-tests-in-different-countries_9789264167216-13-en#page3>.
36 DIBP, Labour Market Testing in the Subclass 457 Visa Programme: Frequently Asked Questions, November 2013, ibid.
37  A list of MAC publications is available at <www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/aboutus/workingwithus/indbodies/mac/>. In particular, see: MAC, Skilled Shortage Sensible: the recommended shortage 
occupation lists for the UK and Scotland (2008).
38 UK Visas & Immigration, Tier 2 and 5 of the Points Based System Guidance for Sponsors, para 28.16-28.42.
39 Ibid 28.18.
40 For an articulation of this position, see: Paul Kelly, ‘China free trade deal: the political battle deepens’,  The Australian, 1 August 2015.
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altogether. Without labour market testing there is no proper 
mechanism to ascertain that temporary migrant workers are not 
replacing the jobs of local workers. Firstly, this damages public 
confidence in the temporary migration system which is necessary 
for its continuing functioning. Public confidence in immigration 
policy is a fundamental precondition for permissive visa regulations 
– without this confidence, the Australian Government could come 
under pressure to abandon the ChAFTA or the special immigration 
arrangements that it facilitates.41 
Secondly, and equally importantly, the absence of labour market 
testing allows employers to use overseas workers for an ulterior 
motive. Research shows that employer requests to access 
temporary migrant labour cannot be taken at face value and 
may produce a permanent demand (also called a ‘structural 
dependence’) upon temporary migrant labour.42 In some cases a 
request may be made because there is a lack of local workers with 
the particular skill set required to perform the job, however other 
reasons for this shortage can exist: it may be caused by ‘labour-
related shortages’ such as ‘skills gaps’, ‘labour shortages’ and 
‘recruitment difficulties’.43 For example, an employer may have a 
reluctance to invest in training for existing or prospective staff,44 or a 
desire to move towards a deunionised workforce.45 Additionally, for a 
small minority of employers, there could be a belief that, despite the 
requirement that 457 visa workers be employed on terms ‘no less 
favourable’ than their Australian counterparts, it is easier to avoid 
paying award rates and conditions for temporary migrant workers 
who have been recognised as being in a vulnerable labour market 
position.46 Given the possibility for employers to use the 457 visa 
scheme for a motive other than to meet a genuine skill shortage, 
it is necessary to further scrutinise employer attestation that a skill 
shortage exists. This is to ensure ‘the demand for migrant workers 
identified by employers is in fact a demand for workers who can 
be — and end up being — employed in compliance with existing 
employment laws and regulations’.47 
According to respected demographer the late Graeme Hugo, 
independent confirmation of skills shortages is ‘the first fundamental 
step’ in the development of temporary migration schemes and 
cannot be outsourced to employers as they ‘will always have 
a “demand” for foreign workers if it results in a lowering of their 
costs’.48 The simplistic notion that employers will only go to the 
trouble and expense of making a 457 visa application when they 
want to meet a skill shortage skims over a range of motives an 
employer may have for using the 457 visa. The absence of labour 
market testing allows employers to preference temporary migrant 
workers over local workers because of their perceived behavioural 
traits. A study of employers’ motivations for accessing 457 
visa workers found that these were varied and were not always 
contingent upon whether a particular occupation was in shortage.49 
41  See, for example: Christopher F Wright, ‘How Do States Implement Liberal Immigration Policies? Control Signals and Skilled Immigration Reform in Australia’ (2014) 27(3) Governance: An International 
Journal of Policy, Administration and Institutions 397.
42  See, for example: M Ruhs and B Anderson (eds), Who Needs Migrant Workers? Labour Shortages, Immigration and Public Policy (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010); A Geddes and S Scott, ‘UK 
Food Businesses’ Reliance on Low-Wage Migrant Labour: A Case of Choice or Constraint?’ in Ruhs and Anderson (2010); V Ottonelli and T Torres, ‘Inclusivist Egalitarian Liberalism and Temporary 
Migration: A Dilemma’ (2012) 20 Journal of Political Philosophy 202.
43  Sue Richardson, What is a Skills Shortage? (National Centre for Vocational Education Research, 2007).
44  See, eg, Australian Council of Trade Unions, Submission to the National Resources Sector Employment Taskforce, April 2010.
45  For a fascinating insight into how employers can use subclass 457 visa workers to limit union power in their workplaces, see: Ken Phillips, ‘457 visas about union control’, The Australian (Sydney) 2 
April 2013.
46  This point as to the precarious labour market position of some subclass 457 visa workers is explored elsewhere in this part.
47  Martin Ruhs, ‘The Potential of Temporary Migration Programmes in Future International Migration Policy’ (2006) 145 International Labour Review 7, 14.
48 Hugo, above n 16, 59.
49  C Wright and A Constantin, ‘An analysis of employers’ use of temporary skilled visas in Australia’, Submission to the Senate Education and Employment References Committee Inquiry into the impact 
of Australia’s temporary work visa programs on the Australian labour market and on the temporary work visa holders, 1 May 2015.
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This study found that a significant minority of employers sought to 
acquire 457 visa-holders with certain behavioural traits due primarily 
to their dependence on their sponsoring employers, reflecting an 
‘embedded preference’ for temporary migrant workers as a way 
of gaining a competitive advantage.50 The study’s authors refer to 
an earlier investigation by Khoo et al into employer motivations for 
using the 457 visa program and noted that this found that over a 
third of employers used the scheme due to perceived behavioural 
traits of migrant workers, such as ‘higher commitment’ and ‘the 
existence of visa rules limiting workers’ mobility’ as reasons for using 
the scheme.51 This is supported by scholarship which suggests 
employers prefer migrant workers because their labour costs 
less and is easier to dispose of,52 and they are more likely to be 
‘compliant, easy to discipline and cooperative’.53 
The importance of independent labour market testing
A number of independent reviews of Australia’s temporary migration 
scheme, and international organisations identify the importance of 
an independent labour market testing model, holding that without 
it, the entire integrity of the scheme comes into question. For 
example, the following bodies/reports advise of the importance of an 
independent labour market testing model:
 1.  The Organisation for Economic and Cooperation and 
Development advises countries to develop a means for 
mapping where there is a shortfall in domestic labour that needs 
to be filled through migration. The OECD recommends that 
identification of skill shortages by employers be independently 
confirmed to ensure their legitimacy: 
  Historically, requests by employers have not been  
considered a fully reliable guide in this regard, at least not 
without some verification by public authorities to ensure  
that the requests represent actual labour needs that  
cannot be filled from domestic sources’.55 
 2.  The Independent Review into the 457 Visa led by Mr John 
Azarius, and commissioned by the Abbott Government in 
2014 had, as its central recommendation, the development 
of an independent labour market testing model through the 
establishment of a tripartite ministerial advisory council.56 
  One of the council’s main tasks will be to make 
recommendations on the occupations that should be 
included in the department’s 457 occupation list. To start 
with, the council will bring together evidence from all the 
government departments with labour market expertise: the 
Departments of Employment, Industry, Health, Education, 
and, of course, Immigration and Border Protection. After 
analysing the factual evidence, the council will take all 
stakeholders’ views into account and present options to  
the Minister. 
  This proposal has several advantages. It replaces two flawed 
requirements, the lack of responsiveness of the current 
occupations list and the inadequacy of labour market testing, 
with a system which is transparent to all stakeholders; 
which benefits from their full participation and buy-in; which 
responds quickly to the dynamic changes in the Australian 
labour market; which is based on factual evidence rather than 
poorly substantiated claims; which is objectively analysed 
by technical experts; and which considerably reduces 
government silos.57 
 3.  The Australian Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs 
Committee recommended the development of an independent 
labour market testing model for the 457 visa program. The 
committee’s final report stated:
  In the committee’s view, the evidence to the inquiry has 
established that the 457 visa program should be serviced 
by a specific list or lists of in-demand skilled occupations 
for Australia and, where necessary, specific state or regional 
labour markets. As occurs with the Skilled Occupation List, 
the Australian Workforce and Productivity Agency should be 
tasked with and appropriately funded to compile and regularly 
review the content of the 457 visa program list.58 
 4.  Similarly, other academics such as Professor Graeme Hugo59 
and Dr Christopher F Wright60 have endorsed the need for 
independent labour market testing.61 
Conclusion
It is imperative that Australia has a regulatory mechanism to 
determine the composition of its migrant worker intake. Although 
labour market testing cannot be used in isolation, it is a vital 
regulatory technique to ascertain what skill shortages and labour 
shortages exist within the Australian economy. Labour market testing 
50 Ibid.
51  S.E. Khoo, P McDonald, C Voigt-Graf and G Hugo, ‘A global labor market: Factors motivating the sponsorship and temporary migration of skilled workers to Australia’ 41 (2007) International Migration 
Review, 480.
52 M. J. Piore, Birds of Passage: Migrant Labor and Industrial Societies (Cambridge University Press: 1979).
53 Ruhs and Anderson (eds) Who Needs Migrant Workers: Labour Shortages, Immigration and Public Policy (Oxford, OUP 2010) 20.
54 OECD, International Migration Outlook: Sopemi 2009 (OECD Publishing, 2009) 133.
55 Ibid 134.
56  Although the Azarius report recommended the abolition of employer-conducted labour market testing, it was not opposed to labour market testing altogether. In fact, it was strongly supportive of the 
need for an independent labour market testing model. This is in contrast to the incorrect assertion in the submission of the Business Council of Australia to the JSCOT inquiry into the ChAFTA, where 
the BCA states, ‘The Business Council has consistently argued for the abolition of labour market testing because it is ineffective and inferior to other safeguards and unnecessarily adds to regulatory 
burden. Numerous reviews, including last year’s independent review of the integrity of temporary skilled migration (Azarias Review), have made these findings.’ Although the BCA may have been 
referring to employer-conducted labour market testing, it is inaccurate to identify the Azarius Review as against labour market testing altogether.
57  J Azarias et al, Robust New Foundations A Streamlined Transparent and Responsive System for the 457 Programme An Independent Review to the Integrity in the Subclass 457 Programme, 
September 2014, 9.
58  Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs References Committee, ‘The Framework and Operation of Subclass 457 Visas, Enterprise Migration Agreements and Regional Migration Agreements’ (Final 
Report, 2013) 35.
59  According to Hugo, this is ‘the first fundamental step’ in the development of temporary migration schemes and cannot be outsourced to employers as they ‘will always have a “demand” for foreign 
workers if it results in a lowering of their costs’: Graeme Hugo, ‘Best Practice in Temporary Labour Migration for Development: A Perspective from Asia and the Pacific’ (2009) 47(5) International 
Migration 23, 59.
60  Wright and Constantin, ‘recommend the establishment of an independent mechanism to verify the existence of skills shortages before employers can use the 457 visa. We also support the use 
of a more precise list of occupations for sponsorship.’ C Wright and A Constantin, ‘An analysis of employers’ use of temporary skilled visas in Australia’, Submission to the Senate Education and 
Employment References Committee Inquiry into the impact of Australia’s temporary work visa programs on the Australian labour market and on the temporary work visa holders, 1 May 2015, p 3.
61  The author has also recommended the introduction of independent labour market testing in two scholarly articles: Joanna Howe ‘Is the Net Cast Too Wide? An Assessment of Whether the Regulatory 
Design of the 457 Visa Meets Australia’s Skill Needs’ (2013) 41 Federal Law Review 443; J Howe, ‘Does Australia need an expert commission to assist with managing its labour migration program?’ 
(2014) 27 Australian Journal of Labour Law.
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is necessary to ensure local workers are not replaced by temporary 
migrant workers. The OECD, two Australian government reports and 
the wealth of scholarship in this area suggests that labour market 
testing is important, and that independent labour market testing is a 
preferable model.
ISSUE #2: Enforcement of Chinese Workers’ 
Rights under Australian Labour Law
Will Chinese workers receive the same wages  
and conditions as Australian workers performing 
equivalent jobs?
Under the ChAFTA Chinese workers have the same workplace rights 
and entitlements as Australian workers. For example, with regards 
to IFAs, the memorandum specifically states that all employers will 
‘be required to comply with applicable Australian laws, including 
minimum wage, workplace law, work safety law and relevant 
Australian licensing, regulation and certification standards.’
This has led many commentators to argue that this legal equality 
of entitlements and rights means there is no incentive for an 
employer to preference hiring Chinese workers over local workers.62 
Nonetheless, there is a substantial literature examining the 
phenomenon of temporary labour migration that clearly establishes 
the particular vulnerability of temporary migrant workers which 
renders these workers extremely vulnerable to exploitation despite 
a legal right to equality of remuneration, conditions, treatment and 
rights as local workers.63 This is for a number of reasons.
Firstly, Chinese workers will be unlikely to complain about being 
paid below the Australian minimum wage or the relevant market 
salary rate because whatever they are earning here is still likely to 
be far more than what they would receive back in China. Many 
Chinese workers employed using the ChAFTA’s provisions will be 
‘remittance workers’ motivated by a desire to temporarily remain in 
Australia and to send a large amount of their wages back to China 
where its purchasing power is worth far more. This provides an even 
stronger disincentive for Chinese workers to bring to light the fact of 
their exploitation. Without inside informants, it is highly unlikely that 
Australian authorities will uncover it. 
This is because Chinese workers will operate with a ‘dual frame of 
reference’ that computes the wages and conditions that can be 
earned in Australia compared with China.64 Unlike Australia, China 
has no national minimum wage as each province sets its own rate. 
Table 1 and Table 2 identify that in Beijing the hourly minimum wage 
is 18.70 yuan ($3.96 AUD) compared with $17.29 AUD in Australia. 
Given that China has nowhere near the labour market protections 
or a strong (and enforced) minimum wage,65 this may induce 
Chinese workers to accept conditions illegal under Australian law in 
the knowledge that these conditions are far superior to those that 
would be experienced in China, a willingness that might be openly 
exploited by some employers.66 
Table 1: Minimum Wages (per month)  
in China and Australia
China67 Australia68
Shenzhen 2,030 yuan / $430 AUD
$2847 AUD
Shanghai 2,020 yuan / $428 AUD
Guangdong 1,895 yuan / $401 AUD
Beijing 1,720 yuan / $364 AUD
Inner Mongolia 1,640 yuan / $347 AUD
Sichuan 1,500 yuan / $318 AUD
Hunan 1,390 yuan / $294 AUD
Hainan 1,270 yuan / $260 AUD
Table 2: Minimum Wages (per hour)  
in China and Australia
China69 Australia70
Beijing 18.70 yuan / $3.96 AUD $17.29 AUD
Secondly, the ChAFTA provides for an employer-driven model of 
temporary labour migration. It hinges entirely upon a model of 
employer sponsorship. For both IFAs and general temporary labour 
migration provided for in Annex 10-A, a business has the dual 
relationship with a Chinese worker as their sponsor and employer. 
A Chinese worker’s right to remain in Australia is wholly contingent 
upon the employer’s continuing demand for their labour. Withdrawal 
of support from an employer-sponsor may mean cancellation of the 
visa. This threat, actual or perceived, may induce an IFA worker to 
accept any degree of substandard working conditions and creates 
a strong disincentive for these workers to voice concerns about 
their wages, conditions, treatment or rights for fear of being sent 
home. An independent review for the Department of Immigration 
into Australia’s temporary labour migration scheme found that a 
model built upon employer-demand for migrant labour made migrant 
workers extremely vulnerable:
62  For example, see: Jennifer Hewett, ‘Labor reckless on free trade deal’, The Australian Financial Review, 19 August 2015; Paul Kelly, ‘China free trade deal: the political battle deepens’,  The Australian, 
1 August 2015.
63  For example, see: Brigid Anderson, ‘Migration, Immigration Controls and the Fashioning of Precarious Workers’ (2010) 24(2) Work, Employment and Society 300.
64  M. J. Piore, Birds of Passage: Migrant Labor and Industrial Societies (Cambridge University Press: 1979).
65  For an excellent explanation of the difficulties of minimum wage enforcement in China and for a description of its labour laws more generally, see: Sean Cooney, Sarah Biddulph and Ying Zhu, Law and 
Fair Work in China (Routledge 2013).
66  Ruhs and Anderson, Who Needs Migrant Workers? 29.
67  Minimum wages differ across localities in China. Recent rises in minimum wage levels have been reported in the Chinese media. For example, see: < http://www.scmp.com/news/china/money-wealth/
article/1831933/fourteen-chinese-cities-provinces-raise-minimum-wage>.
68 Information about Australia’s minimum wage can be found here: <http://www.fairwork.gov.au/about-us/policies-and-guides/fact-sheets/minimum-workplace-entitlements/minimum-wages>.
69  Minimum wages differ across localities in China. Recent rises in minimum wage levels have been reported in the Chinese media. For example, see: < http://www.scmp.com/news/china/money-wealth/
article/1831933/fourteen-chinese-cities-provinces-raise-minimum-wage>.
70  Information about Australia’s minimum wage can be found here: <http://www.fairwork.gov.au/about-us/policies-and-guides/fact-sheets/minimum-workplace-entitlements/minimum-wages>.
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  Despite the views of some employers and employer 
organisations, Subclass 457 visa holders are different from 
other employees in Australian workplaces. They are the only 
group of employees whose ability to remain in Australia is largely 
dependent upon their employment and to a large extent, their 
employer. It is for these reasons that visa holders are vulnerable 
and are open to exploitation.71 
Thus, although a Chinese worker technically has a right to equal 
treatment and equal remuneration and conditions, the violation of 
this right is unlikely to be vocalised. The risk of losing one’s residence 
and right to work in Australia including the expected income acts as 
a significant deterrent.
Thirdly, although it is true that Chinese workers will be required to 
be employed in accordance with our employment laws and are 
entitled to Australian wages and conditions, it is equally true that 
where these workers are being exploited or being used to undercut 
local wages and conditions, it is highly unlikely this will be uncovered 
by authorities. Often migrant workers are not even aware of their 
rights,72 and there is no requirement to inform them in their own 
language of their representative registered organisation and of the 
role of the Fair Work Ombudsman. Of even greater concern is the 
fear some Chinese workers may have of retribution upon their return 
to China, if they voice concerns about exploitative treatment by a 
Chinese employer in Australia.73 
Moreover, the body charged with weeding out exploitation of 
temporary migrant workers in the Australian labour market is not 
sufficiently resourced to uncover every instance of exploitation. 
Whilst the Fair Work Ombudsman has an important role in pursuing 
prosecutions of employers involved in exploiting temporary migrant 
workers,74 its resources are limited and out of necessity the FWO 
adopts a strategy of pursuing high profile targets in order to 
maximise the impact of its investigative and prosecutorial work. 
Whilst these, and other enforcement initiatives of the FWO are 
appropriate, the regulatory capacity of the FWO is necessarily 
bounded by the huge challenge presented by Australia’s geography 
and the significant number of temporary migrant workers. It seems 
unlikely that the FWO’s current resourcing and powers is sufficient, a 
point which has been highlighted by recent media investigations into 
exploitation of temporary migrant workers.75 The FWO currently has 
300 inspectors divided into teams: compliance, early intervention, 
alternative dispute resolution and campaigns. Its inspectorate is 
required to serve up to 11.6 million workers,76 over 10% of which 
are temporary migrants with work rights in the domestic economy.77 
The logistical challenges involved in enforcing the rights of Chinese 
temporary migrant workers, especially given the strong disincentive 
to complain to the FWO about mistreatment because of high wage 
differentials between China and Australia, creates a vulnerability that 
might be openly exploited by some employers.
Table 3: Visa-holders with work rights
Visa holders with work rights Stock figures as at 31 December 2014
457 visa scheme 167 910
Seasonal Worker Program 2014
International student program 303 170
Temporary Graduate visa scheme 19 510
Working Holiday program 160 940
New Zealand citizens 623 440
Total 1 276 984
Table 4: Australian Enforcement Operations78
Enforcement Agency Number of inspectors
Department of Immigration and 
Border Protection
40
Fair Work Ombudsman 300
Table 5: Number of Workers Versus 
Number of Inspectors
Number of visa holders with work rights 1.2 million
Number of workers in Australia 11.6 million
Number of Inspectors 340
Another reason Chinese workers will be unlikely to complain about 
exploitative treatment in the workplace is because Australia’s visa  
arrangements deter temporary migrant workers from bringing instances  
of exploitation to the authorities. This is because the 457 visa contains 
particular conditions pertaining to work, which, if breached breach, 
may lead to a visa holder being fined, detained or deported under 
Australian immigration law. This provides scope for unscrupulous 
employers to coerce temporary migrant workers to breach their 
visa’s work condition and to then threaten to report them to the 
Department of Immigration if they fail to comply with employer 
requests or if they voice concerns about exploitative treatment.79 
Additionally, for Chinese workers who are 457 visa holders, a 
primary cause for their reluctance to voice complaints about 
exploitative treatment is the close relationship between the Fair 
Work Ombudsman and the Department of Immigration and the 
fact that information sharing occurs between the two agencies 
71  Visa Subclass 457 Integrity Review, Final Report (Commonwealth of Australia, October 2008) 69.
72  Olney S and Cholewinski R, Migrant Workers and the Rights to Non-discrimination and Equality, in Costello and Freedland (eds) Migrants at work, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014, p 277.
73  For example, see: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2015/country-chapters/china-and-tibet.
74  For example, see: FWO, ‘Litigation Policy’ (Commonwealth of Australia: 3 December 2013, 4th edition).
75  Two investigative television programmes were particularly powerful: ‘Slaving Away: The Dirty Secrets behind Australia’s Fresh Food’, Four Corners, Australian Broadcasting Commission, 4 May 2015; 
‘7-Eleven: The Price of Convenience’, Four Corners, Australian Broadcasting Commission and Fairfax Media, 31 August 2015.
76  Australian Bureau of Statistics, Australian Labour Market Statistics,Cat.No.6105 (8 July 2014).
77  For example in 2013-2014, visas were issued for 260 303 international students, 258 248 working holiday makers and 126 350 subclass 457 visa holders: DIAC, Annual Report 2012-2013, 2.
78  The figures for this table are found in the Department of Immigration and Border Protection’s annual report at p 71-72: <http://www.border.gov.au/ReportsandPublications/Documents/annual-reports/
DIBP_AR_2013-14.pdf>.
79  For example, see: ‘7-Eleven: The Price of Convenience’, Four Corners, Australian Broadcasting Commission and Fairfax Media, 31 August 2015.
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with regards to 457 visa workers. Since 2012, the role of the FWO 
has been extended to monitor employer obligations in relation 
to 457 visa holders under the Migration Amendment (Temporary 
Sponsored Visas) Act 2013 (Cth), which conferred on the FWO 
the powers exercised by inspectors under the Migration Act 1958 
(Cth).80 Any breaches discovered by the FWO must be reported to 
the DIBP.81 The vesting of these powers in the FWO immediately 
raises some concerns in terms of the enforcement of labour 
standards. This leads to a strong perception by 457 visa holders 
that if they complain to the FWO about their working conditions, 
then this information can be passed onto the DIBP which potentially 
could lead to their deportation. For example, a recent investigation 
by FWO inspectors and DIBP officials into visa fraud and worker 
exploitation led to the detention of 38 illegal workers, six of whom 
had been working in breach of their visa conditions.82 This punitive 
action against temporary migrant workers found in exploitative work 
arrangements strongly deters them from informing authorities about 
their situation and inhibits their ability to trust that information they 
provide to the FWO will not be passed on to the DIBP. Additionally, 
as Professor Rosemary Owens points out, a fundamental tenet of 
international norms on labour inspection is that labour inspection 
and effective enforcement should be clearly distinct from each 
other and must not be compromised by the fact that there is 
anything irregular about the status of migrant work: ‘the primary 
duty of labour inspectors is to protect workers and not to enforce 
immigration law’.83 Furthermore, conferring migration inspectorate 
roles on labour inspectors, like what has effectively happened to 
FWO inspectors, may result in reduced resources available to the 
central objective of enforcing labour standards.84 
Thus, whilst the ChAFTA requires Chinese workers to be paid according 
to Australian law, where this does not occur it is highly unlikely it will 
be detected. This renders Chinese workers vulnerable to exploitation 
in the labour market and may create ‘a reality of non-compliance’85 
with Australian labour law with respect to their employment.
Finally, it is important to briefly allude to growing concern about what 
is referred to as ‘China’s development model’, as this will necessarily 
have a bearing on the likelihood that Chinese workers will be paid 
and treated in accordance with Australian labour laws. In analysing 
opposition to the ChAFTA, Editor in Chief of The Australian, Paul 
Kelly makes the following observation ‘there is concern about 
China’s development model — bringing in large numbers of foreign 
workers for projects’.86 A recent review of Chinese engagement 
in Africa provides a more expansive articulation of a Chinese 
development model hinging upon the importation of low cost 
Chinese labour to staff infrastructure projects.Although Australia’s 
labour laws are move comprehensive than those of many African 
80  Howe, J, Hardy, T and Cooney, S (2013), ‘Mandate, Discretion and Professionalism at an Employment Standards Enforcement Agency: An Antipodean Experience’ 35 Law and Society 1.
81  For a description of the process of information sharing between the FWO and the DIBP, see: < http://www.fairwork.gov.au/find-help-for/visa-holders-and-migrants#working-holiday-visa>.
82  P Dutton and M Cash (2015), ‘Illegal Workers Targeted Nationally’, media release, 28 May 2015.
83  ILO (International Labour Organisation) (2006), Labour Inspection, Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, General Survey of the Reports 
Concerning the Labour Inspection Convention 1947 (No 81) (etc), International Labour Conference, 95th session, 2006. For more on this point, see Rosemary Owens, ‘Temporary Labour Migration: Is 
Effective Enforcement Possible?’ in Temporary Labour Migration in the Global Era edited by Howe and Owens.
84  Ibid.
85  This notion of ‘a reality of non-compliance’ draws upon argument of Joo-Cheong Tham. He states, ‘Insofar as migrant workers are displacing local workers because they constitute a cheaper and 
more flexible source of labour, such ‘attractiveness’ of migrant labour can be traced to the vulnerability of migrant workers and the structural risk of non-compliance they experience’: Joo-Cheong 
Tham, Submission to the Senate Education and Employment References Committee Inquiry into the impact of Australia’s temporary work visa programs on the Australian labour market and on the 
temporary work visa holders, 1 May 2015.
86  Paul Kelly, ‘China free trade deal: the political battle deepens,’ The Australian, 1 August 2015.
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countries and the role of unions and its labour inspectorate are more 
entrenched, there is concern that Chinese companies will seek to 
replicate its approach in Africa of importing large numbers of  
Chinese workers in Australia. For example, Hanauer and Morris, write:
  Reliable numbers are difficult to come by, but the Chinese 
government estimated in early 2013 that 1 million Chinese 
nationals are living and working in Africa…The majority of them 
are laborers who come to work on a project managed by a 
large Chinese enterprise and who return to China after several 
years. These workers are often the focus of local ire because 
they are perceived as taking jobs that should go to local 
nationals or taking all of the management jobs and then  
abusing local laborers working under their authority.87 
Further, a study of Zambia’s Chinese State-owned copper mines, 
reached the conclusion that Chinese companies undercut local 
wages and conditions, had little regard for health and safety 
practices, did not know how to work cooperatively with local 
unions and were dismissive of local labour laws.88 Another study of 
African perceptions regarding Chinese investment reached a similar 
conclusion. This found that the last decade of Chinese investment 
has been accompanied by China importing its own workforce to 
meet the personnel needs arising from this investment in breach of 
local labour standards.89 
Although a thorough assessment of the African experience with 
accelerated Chinese investment since the turn of the millennium is  
beyond the scope of this report, it is important to be mindful of this  
experience when evaluating the likelihood of Chinese project companies 
using IFAs, or the provisions in Chapter 10 of the ChAFTA, to use 
Chinese workers to staff their investment projects in Australia. 
Recommendation 10:
This report recommends the Australian Government substantially 
increase the enforcement capacity of the Fair Work Ombudsman, 
its powers under the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) and its ability 
to impose penalties on employers who breach Australian 
employment law.
Recommendation 11:
This report recommends the increasing of civil and criminal 
penalties for employers found breaching Australian law with 
respect to the hiring and employment of temporary migrant 
workers.
Recommendation 12:
This report recommends that all temporary migrant workers, 
including Chinese workers entering the Australia labour market via 
the ChAFTA, be given an induction in their own language which 
details their workplace rights under Australian law and advises on 
support services available in the event of a breach of these rights 
or any other workplace issue.
Recommendation 13
The identities of migrant workers who report instances of 
exploitation to the Fair Work Ombudsman or to any other body 
should not be provided to the Department of Immigration and 
Border Protection.
87  L Hanauer and L Morris, Chinese Engagement in Africa: Drivers, Reactions and Implications for US Policy, Rand Corporation Research Report. A copy of the report can be found here: <http://www.
rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR521.html>. See also David H Shinn and Joshua Eisenman, China and Africa: A Century of Engagement (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012.) 222.
88  Human Rights Watch, ‘You’ll be fired if you refuse: Labor Abuses in Zambia’s Chinese State-owned Copper Mines’ (2011). A copy of this report can be found here: <https://www.hrw.org/
report/2011/11/04/youll-be-fired-if-you-refuse/labor-abuses-zambias-chinese-state-owned-copper-mines>.
89  Ethics Institute of South Africa, ‘Africans Perception of Chinese Business in Africa: A Survey’, August 2014, p 13. A copy of the report can be found here: <http://www.ethicsa.org/
phocadownloadpap/Research_Reports/AfricanPerceptionSurveyChineseBusinessWEBSITEVERSION.pdf>.
